Introduction
Medieval philosophers while commenting on Aristotle's works on natural philosophy noticed many apporiai in his physics. What is more, inspired by William of Ockham (ca. 1280 Ockham (ca. -1349 , they rejected Aristotelian prohibition of metabasis limiting the use of geometry only to scientice media? (intermediate sciences), such as optics or astronomy, which deal only with quantified aspects of natural phenomena and not the whole phenomenon'.
In the 14 th century the members of the famous English School, so-called Oxford Calculators introduced to physics both: mathematics, understood as a proper language of science, and logic understood as the convenient way to pose problems. Therefore, it seems interesting to examine if they have any project of mathematical physics and if so whether it made them stand any closer to modern science. Since it is no more doubtful that Galileo, while proving a proper rule of accelerate motion, used the Mean Speed Theorem, formulated by one of the Calculators, William Heytesbury (ca. 1313-1372) 2 , and that Newton employed the 14 lh century theory of compounding ratios 3 , it seems attractive to go back to a continuity/discontinuity in the history of natural science.
One of the most distinguished historians of medieval science, Annelise Maier, regarded the history of natural philosophy from the thirteenth to the 18 1 ' 1 century as the history of the gradual rejection of Aristotelianism. She claimed that it did not evolve uniformly from century to century, but it " The paper is a revised version of an article titled: Why vra. 14, und 15. Jahrhunderts, t. 31, Berlin -New York 2004, pp. 495-51 I. occurred in two stages: the first reached its culmination in the 14 th century, the second in the seventeenth 1 . However, it was Pierre Duhein, who first clearly expressed the idea that modern mechanics was a product of the Middle Ages, by which he reversed the previous, predominant view, that the period preceding the Scientific Revolution in the 17 lh century had no importance at all for the development of science 2 . The initial favourable response to Duhem's theory by those historians, who believed that he had succeeded in discovering fourteenth-century precursors of Galileo and Newton, was replaced by the criticism. Marshall Clagett, was convinced that late medieval doctrines reveal how the very points of criticism of the older system became points of departure for the new\ Annelise Maier saw the greatest weakness of Duhem's theory in his neglect of the different contexts of doing science in the 14 th and 17 th centuries and in his examinations of medieval theories from the perspective of later scientific beliefs 4 .
According to Edward Grant there were contextual and substantive preconditions that enabled the Scientific Revolution to develop. The contextual pre-conditions, he understands as the open availability of the translations of Greco-Arabic works on science and natural philosophy into Latin, the formation of the medieval university, and the emergence of the logically trained natural philosophers who created a social environment. The substantive pre-condition of the Scientific Revolution, he founds in inventing new methodologies, in using new scientific language, in bringing into light new scientific problems, and in giving new answers to old questions. That resulted in the intensive development of natural philosophy -the mother of all sciences. Hence, in Grand's opinion, the new practice in scientific inquiry in the fourteenth-century laid the foundation for the science that came to fruition in the seventeenth-century 5 .
Grant's views were strongly criticized by Andrew Cunningham 6 , who emphasized the significant difference between natural philosophy, which was practiced in Europe from the early thirteenth to the early nineteenth century, ' and 20"' centuries) , disciplines fulfilling different roles in their respective eras". From Cunningham's examination of the history of medieval period one can emerge several lucid and plausible historical explanations of the context of medieval learning. His insistence that natural philosophy had nothing to do with science deprives science of its own history and so, it forces us to examine more clearly its actual history. In every epoch, we find in science irrelevant questions, wrong answers and ad hoc solutions. In my opinion, problems do not become or cease to be scientific simply because they are considered by friars, monks or secular clerics, which is Cunningham's main argument against the possibility of doing science in the Middle Ages. I do not believe that I could understand better the medieval, the Galilean or the Newtonian science of motion, explaining particular problems, e.g. of free fall of heavy bodies, just because I would judge that before the 19 th century all natural philosophy was about God and His creatures. Nature does not behave differently in different times: stones consistently fall down with accelerated motion in all time period. Therefore in this paper, I will go back into the old battle about the continuity/discontinuity problem of science. In order to refine what the continuity or discontinuity in science and especially mathematical physics means, I will underscore the changes within medieval physics and point up the complete rupture with the medieval past that was executed by Galileo vis-à-vis the Aristotelian world. I will focus on aspects of 14 th century science of motion, which historians of medieval science consider responsible for significant departures from the Aristotelian natural philosophy. (1330/40-1396) , I will briefly discuss their opinions. I will not pay attention to experimental science and the experimental verification of mathematical analyses of motion, since I cannot find any witness of such procedures in medieval mechanics.
The Medieval Tradition in Mechanics
It is beyond any doubt, that notions, such as velocity, gravity, impetus, and force have entirely different connotations in the theory of relativity or quantum mechanics and in the classical Newtonian mechanics, as well as in medieval science. I am aware that whereas the term mechanics can be applied to the Galilean and the Newtonian theories of motion, its application to medieval science is anachronistic. Although in the Middle Ages we find works on statics and on the science of motion, the notion of mechanics 1 did not appear as a description of the science of motion and force, which had a set of principles describing dynamics, kinematics and statics, where, an equilibrium would be treated as a special case of motion, with zero or constant velocity. In this paper, however, I will adopt this anachronistic notion and I will narrow my focus to the study of physics of motion and force.
Medieval thinkers were familiar with two distinct, Greek traditions in mechanics: one deriving from Archimedes and the other from Aristotle. The Archimedean tradition, known to medieval philosophers, was connected with the geometrical and static approach to the science of weight that appeared in the West with the works of Archimedes, Euclid and the In the opinion of Richard Westfall, those who followed that tradition of the medieval science of mechanics had not recognised any distinction between statics and dynamics, since the simple machines, such as the lever, obviously served not to hold bodies in equilibrium, but to move them; and consequently, were analysed in dynamic terms 4 .
It is the work of an Arabic author, Thabit ibn Qurra's (836-901) On the Kariston which should be blamed for blending Archimedes' static proofs with the dynamic solutions of the problems considered in Mechanical Problems. Undoubtedly, in the Middle Ages the statics with its superior mathematics made its impact through the dynamic Aristotelian tradition. While commenting Aristotle's works on the philosophy of nature, the medieval authors, first and foremost, followed his Physics. In accordance with Aristotle there are two kinds of motion: a natural and violent one. The former is described dynamically, since a downward motion of a heavy body is caused by a natural attribute, such as gravity or weight. The latter, on the other hand, is studied statically when a violent motion is considered to be caused by a force acting against a pondus, i.e. against the resistant weight of a body. In the 14 th century, however, scholars formulated laws describing both types of motion in the same way.
Mathematical Physics in the 14
th Century In order to acknowledge the influence of mathematics upon medieval science of motion, I will now examine the most significant elements of a new approach toward science of motion which resulted in a developing of a project of mathematical physics adopted by the English philosophers. Those elements, 1 Pseudo-Aristotle, Mechanical Problems, 847a 10-11. in my opinion, are: the accommodation of the Archimedean influence in mechanics, the New Rule of Motion invented by Richard Kilvington and developed by Thomas Bradwardine, the quantification of qualities leading to kinematics and, finally, the mental experiments based on the secundum imaginationem procedure that was frequently accompanied by the ceteris paribus method. The role of John Buridan, famous for the impetus theory, will also be invoked here, even though he did not accept mathematical methods in physics.
Various scholars stress the predominant role of one or the other of these aspects as the essential reason for the changing views in science in the fourteenth-century. Alistair Crombie finds the sources for medieval mathematical physics in Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1175-1253) While saying this, Crombie is only partly right. When he talks about subordination of physical sciences to mathematics, Crombie is wrong. We cannot forget that Grosseteste's physics was based on his metaphysics of immaterial light, strongly connected with optics which found use for such science as geometry. Still, in Aristotle's opinion, optics, one of the scientice medice, is subordinated to mathematics, but because it deals with immaterial bodies it is not a legitimate part of physics, that studies material bodies in motion. We cannot forget that a measurement found its use only in intermediate sciences and not in mechanics. We should not treat measurement in optics to be the first step in experimental science of motion, since none of the medieval philosophers of nature was interested in a measuring of observed objects. There were no systematic observations of motion, which would result ' . Therefore, in accord with Grosseteste, mathematicians were at liberty to think for their own purposes, e.g., of space as empty or of infinite extent, because it was not the same thing as real space. The geometer could not be accused of being false because he used abstract concepts not to be observed in physical world. Mathematics, then, was a convenient tool for describing both physical and mental experiments". It seems that fourteenth-century English philosophers closely followed Grosseteste, even thought they did not accept his metaphysics of light. The authority of the Lyncolniensis was invoked in many works of the Oxford Calculators in the 14 th century.
Marshall Clagett, who states that the later development of mathematical physics was associated with the impact of Archimedes, not only on the elementary geometrical treatises, such as Thomas Bradwardine's Speculative geometry but also on the questions concerning motion, is also partially right. The very best example that confirms Clagett's opinion, comes from Richard Kilvington's commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Kilvington explains here a hypothetical motion of an elementary body in a void by means of the following Jordanus Nemorarius's postulates coming from his famous treatise De ponderibus: 1) That which is heavier descends more rapidly; 2) This is heavier in descending, whose motion toward the center is more direct; 3) This is heavier positionally, whose path at a given position of descent is less oblique 3 . Following a medieval tradition, Kilvington blended Euclid-Archimedean views, as represented by Nemorarius, with Aristotle's theory.
Already before Bradwardine, Kivington 4 used the first theorem of Jordanus which runs as follows: The proportion between the speeds of descent of any given heavy bodies is the same as that between their respective weights. He did so in order to corroborate his original rule of motion relating speeds, forces, and resistances in an exponential function 5 . The New Rule of Motion generally is in accord with Aristotelian principle of motion, which holds that a speed of motion is proportional to a proportion of an acting element, which we call a force (F) to a suffering element, which we call a resistance (R). With regard to a rule formulated in Book VII of Physics a body is in motion only when a force is greater than resistance, i.e. when a proportion of F:R is greater than 1. A speed of motion is proportional to F:R proportion 1 . Consequently, in the world of Aristotle, there is no possibility for motion to occur with a speed less than 1. To avoid this apparent weakness of Aristotle's theory Kilvington, and later Bradwardine, applies Euclid's definition of a double proportion. They state that a speed is doubled only if the ratio F:R is multiplied by itself and a speed is halved when we determine the middle ratio, i.e. when we find a ratio that equals a square root of F:R ratio 2 . Such a procedure has the undeniable benefit of mathematical as well as physical consistency. It guarantees that in the description of any motion continuously diminishing by continuous halving an initial ratio of a speed of motion will always be greater than 0. Aristotle explains that a speed of motion is doubled either when a force is doubled or when a resistance is halved, so then a proportion of F:R is simply multiplied by two 3 . Kilvington is aware that the proper understanding of Euclid's definition of operations on ratios necessitates a new interpretation of Aristotle's rules of motion.
This explanation, however, had nothing to do, like many of the historians of medieval science claim, with a new rule for free fall of a heavy body, but it was only a clarification of Aristotle's rules, which were correct only in one case, when the ratio of force to resistance was 2:1, since then both in multiplying the proportion by two and by itself (that is squaring it) one arrived at the same result.
Since Kilvington's commentary on the Physics was written ca. 1326, it is obvious that the situation in medieval physics did not change dramatically in
1328, when Thomas Bradwardine wrote his "Treatise on the Proportions of Velocities in Motion", and that Bradwardine did not remove the whole problem of relating velocities, forces and resistances from the context of an exposition of Aristotle's words and did not investigate it in its own right as Edith D. Sylla and John Murdoch assert
4 . First of all, this was because Bradwardine followed Kilvington, who had shared Grosseteste's opinion that mathematics was a proper method in physics, useful in all branches of scientific inquiry dealing with measurable objects. This belief, which had encouraged Kilvington first to argue against Aristotle, Archimedes, and Jordanus, and then to explain their statements with mathematical precision enforced by Euclid's definition of a double proportion, was later taken over by Bradwardine 5 .
1 Aristotle, Physics VII, 250a-b.
: If. anachronistically, force-resistance proportion is generalised symbolically by exponential function, then if F| :R| gives rise to a speed vi, the increasing of this proportion to F^R: will yield v 2 , in such way that the following relations are hold: F : :R 2 = (F,:Ri) vlvl . Hence, if v,= l/2v, F 2 :R 2 =(F,:R,)"-; ifv : =2v,, F ; :R : =(F,:Ri) 2 '. Thanks to this we always have a proportion of F:R greater than 1 even if the speed of motion decreases. It seems also that Ockham's theory of connotation, which treats motion as a connotative term describing the change that a body undergoes, was the first step in the separation of the two different aspects of motion: i.e. the dynamics and kinematics later developed by the Oxford Calculators when they pondered the problem of qualitative changes explained in terms of local motion with regard to its effects, i.e. velocity, time and path. Thus the growth of interest in kinematics -as Goddu claims -was caused by the tendency to replace the view of motion as a qualitative accident with entirely quantitative and relation considerations based not on empirical evidence or measurement but on mathematical consistency or coherence 3 ". These tendencies matured in the works of William Heytesbury, who was able to develop metalinguistic and mathematical analyses that grew out of the discussion of the philosophical problem of the intension and remission of forms. It eventually led to the distinction of quality or intensity of speed from quantity of speed and to the concept of latitude of forms or range of degrees. Medieval thinkers dealt with the measuring of the speed of the various ways of distribution of different qualities over or through given subjects. Qualities could be uniformly or difformly distributed in a subject either over distance or over time.
of Vittanova and Bradwardine's Law in: tsis 58, 1967, pp. 56-64. What is more, we should not forget that the idea of measuring motion in the propagation of light by means of double and triple ratios first appeared in Groseseteste's treatise De luce sen de inchoatione formarum, written between 1220-1235. From the considerations of accelerated motion the Oxford Calculators derived the so-called Mean Speed Theorem. It states that a uniformly accelerated motion corresponds to its mean degree of speed, which means that a given latitude of motion uniformly gained in a given time always makes a mobile traverse a space equal to that which would be traversed if the body moved with the middle degree of the latitude for the whole time. Numerous arithmetic and geometric proofs of this theorem were formulated in the 14 th century. The first arithmetical proof was presented by William Hetesbury. The best known geometric proof, which was the most original and comprehensive extant treatment of the intension and remission of qualities and the most elaborate application of the mean-degree measure of speed in motion was formulated by Nicole Oresme 1 . The Mean Speed Theorem accepted and applied by numerous English and French philosophers of the late Middle Ages was also known and used by Galileo 2 .
In my opinion, however, one of the most interesting achievements of the Calculators' mathematical physics lays in their deep awareness of the various degrees of abstraction. Their theories never renounced empirical verification, and they frequently used secundum imaginationem procedure. The secundum imaginationem analyses were usually accompanied by the ceteris paribus method, when all circumstances in a study case being considered are the same, and that only one factor, which changes during the process, causes the changes of the results. The followers of Kilvington raised questions, which could never have emerged from sense experience, since the structure of nature could be discovered only in highly abstractive analyses. This abstraction, however, was drawn from genuine realities and did not contradict them. Therefore, both ways of describing natural phenomena, i.e. physics and mathematics, were complementary. Realities give a starting point for more complicated mental constructions, which in turn make realities comprehensible. While mathematics was a proper instrument to solve problems, logic was the most convenient method to pose them. They both guaranteed the objective and demonstrative character of natural science 3 .
The Oxford Calculator's tradition continued by the next generation of English scholars such as Roger Swineshead, John Dumbleton, and Richard Swineshead was adopted also by many French thinkers. There were two ways that continued the Calculators^ ideas. While Nicholas of Oresme fully accepted the secundum imaginationem procedure leading to mathematical physics and developed his own system for measuring motions', the others, like John Buridan, eliminated mathematics from natural philosophy because of the Aristotelian metabasis prohibition. The hypothetical cases and mental experiments, discussed by Buridan and his followers, were connected with the metalinguistic, logical and theological analysis related to God's absolute and ordained powers 2 . Medieval mechanics, however, owes John Buridan the impetus theory 3 . He was the first to use this term in order to describe the projectile motion, the free fall of a heavy body and the motion of the heavenly spheres. The discussion started with Aristotelian theory of projectile motion presented in his Physics. Aristotle claims that each violent motion, such as projectile one and freely falling body need a constant presence of a mover and therefore when a mobile is no more in touch with its mover, a medium takes its role 4 . The theory of permanent impetus elaborated by Buridan was accepted by other Parisian masters like Albert of Saxony (ca. 1316-1390) and Marislius of Inghen (ca. 1340-1396). In their opinion impetus is a not self-expending quality and it can be only diminished by resistance. Impetus is a variable quality whose force is determined by the speed and quantity of the matter in the subject, so that the acceleration of a falling body can be understood in terms of its gradual accumulation of units of impetus. In the case of projectile motion impetus is the same as the force impressed by the mover, and its quantity depends on a primary matter. If there is more matter, a greater force can be impressed. In a case of free fall impetus is a cause of acceleration of a heavy body. In the case of motion of celestial bodies, impetus is the force impressed by God, which causes their everlasting circular motion. This concept of impetus helps to describe all types of motion: terrestrial, violent and natural motion of heavy bodies as well as motion of celestial, non-material bodies. Buridan's statement is often presented as the first law of inertia.
The Novelty of Medieval Mechanics vis-à-vis Aristotelian and Galilean Theories
For 1300 -1800 , New-York -London 1965 opinion of some historians of medieval science, to be the most important departures of the 14 th century mechanics from Aristotle's physics. First of all, there is a blend of the Aristotelian dynamic tradition and Archimedean static and mathematical tradition. Secondly, there is a refutation of Aristotle's prohibition of metabasis and use of mathematics as the proper method in physics. As I emphasized, it was for the first time in the medieval period that mathematical strictness forced natural philosophers to invent a new rule describing motion. Thirdly, there is the separation of dynamics and kinematics, which led to the formulation of the Mean Speed Theorem formulated in order to compare speed in accelerated motion. Fourthly, there is the promotion of mental experiment. Fifthly, there is the impetus theory, which allowed to explain heavenly circular motion, the free fall of a heavy body and the projectile motion of bodies by means of the same concept of impetus.
Deeper insight into medieval mechanics, however, reveals the constant presence of the Aristotelian background. Even though Kilvington and Bradwardine had broken Aristotelian prohibition of metabasis, they still remained within the framework of his physics, in which motion takes time because of two factors: force and resistance, acting as its causes. The speed of motion is determined by the ratio of force to resistance and the New Rule of Motion does not break this principle. Like Aristotle, Kilvington, Bradwardine, and their followers, had considered a force responsible for a speed and not for a constant acceleration, which was later properly recognized by Galileo and formulated as the second law of motion by Newton in the 17 lh century. Secondly, the notions uniform, uniformly difform and difformly difform motion were used not only to describe the distribution of changes in uniform, accelerate and decelerate motions. For when medieval natural philosophers considered the difformly difform speed, they had in mind not only difform changing of speed, but also uniform changes of acceleration, i.e. a motion with equal increments of acceleration. Such motion does not exist in nature. Furthermore, such terms as uniformly difform motion and uniform increasing of velocity were used in both contexts of free fall, i.e. downward motion and of uniformly accelerated upward motion. This is a part of medieval mechanics to which we do not pay enough attention, since we look only for properly recognized problems 1 .
Thirdly, the impetus theory remains solidly within the Aristotelian matrix of mover and mobile and, as a matter of fact, did not reject the principles of his physics. Furthermore, claiming that it is possible for a body to move eternally with circular motion when there is no acting force, Buridan was unable to formulate the proper law of inertia, since in fact there must be an acting force changing the path in motion if circular motion is to occur. On the familiarity with late medieval physics' departures from Aristotle, which even made him repeat some of their wrong solutions, did not affect his general idea, since he used fragments of medieval mechanics for completely different aims. Galileo, whom we want to make responsible for the beginnings of the Newtonian dynamics, rejected or rather did not take into account the New Rule of Motion and went back to theory expressed by Avempace; he also changed the theory of impetus. Likewise he read Archimedes's works in a different way, what allowed him to create mathematical physics while recognizing the distinction between statics and dynamics. It also permitted him to consider mechanics as a contemplative and mathematical science under geometry that could provide the mechanical arts with their principles and causes. With the two major achievement of Galileo's mechanics, namely the conception whereby horizontal motion is held to be a state in which it remains until some external force causes it to leave, and the identification of free fall as a uniformly accelerated motion and the exposition of its role in nature, the new concepts in mechanics began a career that culminated in Newton's theory. In spite of this, Galileo was able to profit from the secundum imaginationem and ceteris paribus procedures, making a broad use of thought experiments to convince his readers to accept Copernicus's heliocentric theory. Galileo's approach to the problem of a possibility of applying mathematical principles to physical events was to view these principles not as pure mathematical abstractions but as laws that governed experimental science of motion.
Conclusions
To answer the main question of this paper, I would like to stress that each step taken by a new generations of 14 th century natural philosophers was a step forward, even though it was a step taken on the dead-end road of science of motion. In my opinion, medieval mathematical physics was doomed, since even if it succeeded in refuting the restrictive prohibition of metabasis associated with Aristotelian philosophy and accepted mathematics as its method, it did not develop empirical mathematics and experimental physics. This was because, ironically, liberation of mathematics from the limitations of actual experience created a tool of theoretical analysis that would make it impossible to cross over the threshold of exact science. Even though a tradition in mathematical physics continually developed in England from Grosseteste to the middle of the 14 th century and then was continued by French, Italian, and Spanish thinkers such as Alvarus Thomas or Domonik de Soto until the end of the 16 th century, never made a step forward to abandon Aristotle. Paradoxically, Aristotelian physics appeared to be able to accommodate all medieval attempts at providing it with mathematical precision. The 14 th century revolution in mechanics was a revolutionary movement against the background of previous medieval theories, but not against the 17 th century-mechanics. The revolution was held in the details. In its history medieval science, while taking an Aristotelian course thoroughly explored that framework exposing its paradoxes and weakness and reached the point where it was unable to overcome the lingering doubts. The decisive break was left to the successors of medieval philosophers of nature.
After a deliberate study of medieval science of motion and secondary literature I am forced to formulate the final conclusion: fourteenth-century revolution in science should not be regarded as a first step towards the Scientific Revolution. In my opinion medieval science should be treated as a specific phenomenon of medieval culture. Its story is over, yet it still waits for someone to tell it: what it was and what it is not with respect to the modern science. Nevertheless, I am still not ready to accept Andrew Cunningham's point of view, discussed in the introduction of this paper, since those were not friar's cassocks, that unable them to move freely, but it was Aristotle.
